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[Signature]

Director of Central Intelligence

27 September 1960

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CIA (and State Department) Participation in [redacted] Conference

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1. As a matter of interest and for the record, I report herein the position taken by General Hayes (Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and Chairman of the Conference) regarding CIA and State Department participation in [redacted] Conference.

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2. General Hayes took this position to counter a tendency of the G-2 and A-3 representatives at the Conference to argue (a) that the Conference was held by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide intelligence for them, (b) that the provision of intelligence to the JCS was the exclusive function of the Joint Intelligence Committee, (c) that the Service representatives at the Conference represented the members of the JIC, and (d) that consequently the views of a majority of the Service representatives (i.e., G-2 and A-3) should prevail, even with respect to political questions, over those of State and CIA (supported by DSI). This argument was, of course, an attempt to convert a minority into a majority of those having an effective voice in the proceedings.

3. General Hayes acknowledged that the Conference was being held by direction of the JIC pursuant to JCS direction, but observed that the JIC had invited the participation of State and CIA on the presumption that they had a competence in relation to political and other matters beyond the competence of the Service Agencies or of JIC. He asserted that he alone represented the JIC or its several members at the Conference, the position of the Service representatives being that of working-level advisors to him. He did not hold the same authority over the representatives of State and CIA, but must accept their considered judgments on matters within their primary cognizance on the assumption that they spoke with the authority of their respective agencies in such matters. He would expect them to give due consideration to any opinions offered by Service representatives, but, in the event of an unresolved difference, he would rule, in the name of JIC, in favor of the State-CIA position. Any of those rulings which a member of the JIC saw fit to question could, of course, be taken up when the estimate was before JIC for review, after the adjournment of the Conference.

4. In accordance with this doctrine General Hayes actually

DIA AND JCS REVIEW COMPLETED

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rejected several G-2 and A-2 contentions on political matters which were unacceptable to State and CIA. In particular, the notorious Air Force thesis regarding Soviet doctrine and policy, based on a specious pretension to scholarly competence in that political field, was thus rejected. This situation was of special interest in that, whereas we have had to endure innumerable Air Force dissents on political issues, this is the first time that the Air Force thesis which underlay them has been exposed to State and CIA acceptance or rejection. The occasion enabled me to accomplish what I had sought in vain in relation to OME 91-49 and OME 59-50, the closer alignment of State and ONI with CIA in rejecting this Air Force political thesis.

5. Since the National Security Act of 1947 the great defect of the Joint Intelligence Group and Joint Intelligence Committee,

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has been the total absence of any competence with respect to the political factors in strategic situations. Inasmuch as political factors are rarely negligible, even in Joint Staff estimates, this condition encourages the Service Agencies to continue to make jukking political estimates which the more readily find acceptance in the Pentagon because they are not subjected to competent criticism. Indeed, consultation with State or CIA is often deliberately avoided [redacted] because it is known or supposed that the Service political estimate would not survive their criticism, and that an estimate in which they could concurred would not support the policy the Service estimate was designed to promote. General Hagee's attitude served to rootify this situation with respect to [redacted] Conference. It remains a continuing problem, however, with respect to the normal operations of the JIG and JIC.

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CIA Representative

cc AD/OME
Chief, COMPS

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